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Abstract
The economic crisis transformed the way in which European 
citizens relate to politics in general but particularly affect-
ed young people. The crisis resulted in decreased levels 
of trust in political institutions and increased levels of po-
litical protest. But little attention has been paid to the post-
crisis period. Ten years on, what are young people’s atti-
tudes and behaviour? This article examines the potential 
long term consequences of the economic crisis on young 
people’s political interest, political trust and political par-
ticipation. In examining political behaviour we use a clas-
sification of types of participants that allows us to compare 
young people to adults, and young people before, during 
and after the economic crisis. Empirically, we use a descrip-
tive approach using survey data from the European Social 
Survey, covering a considerable period of time (2002-2016) 
and 16 European countries. The comparison is threefold: 
young people over time, young people to adults, and young 
people across countries. The results support the idea of the 
emergence of a post-crisis youth that is more engaged and 
participative than adults and young people before the crisis. 
However the results do not show radical differences among 
countries that were affected by the economic crisis in vary-
ing degrees.
Keywords
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Resumen
La crisis económica transformó la manera en la que los ciu-
dadanos se relacionan con la política, afectando de forma 
más directa a los jóvenes. La crisis supuso un descenso en 
los niveles de confianza en las instituciones políticas, así 
como un aumento de las acciones de protesta. Sin embar-
go, el periodo post-crisis está aún por ser analizado. Diez 
años después, ¿qué ha ocurrido con las actitudes y compor-
tamientos políticos de los jóvenes? Este artículo analiza las 
potenciales consecuencias a largo plazo del interés por la 
política y la confianza institucional de los jóvenes, así como 
de sus niveles de participación política. Al examinar su com-
portamiento político, usamos una clasificación de distintos 
tipos de participantes que nos permite comparar jóvenes y 
adultos, y también los jóvenes de antes, durante y después 
de la crisis. A nivel empírico, utilizamos una estrategia des-
criptiva, valiéndonos de datos de encuesta de la Encuesta 
Social Europea, cubriendo un importante periodo de tiempo 
(2002-2016) y 16 países europeos. La comparación, por tan-
to, es triple: jóvenes a lo largo del tiempo, jóvenes y adultos 
y jóvenes en diferentes países. Los resultados apoyan la 
idea del surgimiento de una juventud distinta en el periodo 
post-crisis, más implicada y participativa que los adultos y 
los jóvenes de antes de la crisis. Con todo, los resultados 
no muestran diferencias radicales entre países más y menos 
afectados por la crisis económica.
Palabras Clave
Actitudes de los jóvenes; Europa Occidental; Juventud; 
Participación política; Recesión económica.
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The early years of the economic crisis affected 
people in very similar ways in many developed coun-
tries. Levels of political satisfaction and of trust in 
political institutions decreased, protests generally in-
creased, and parties in government were punished by 
voters (Kriesi 2014). During a second stage, around 
2012, the response to increasing austerity measures 
was more aggressive in some countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal, as it af-
fected the quality of specific welfare state services 
(Ronchi 2018). The political consequences of the cri-
sis reproduced this North-South divide. Whereas at-
titudinal indicators normalized in Northern European 
countries, the levels of discontent and distrust inten-
sified in the South. Protests were even more intense, 
and the electoral response went far beyond punish-
ing the incumbent parties. In Spain, Italy and Greece, 
the party system changed, new parties appeared and 
traditional mainstream parties obtained their worst 
results. Portugal remains the only exception to this 
process (Bosco and Verney 2016; Casal Bértoa and 
Bourne 2017; Casal Bértoa and Weber 2018). 
Beyond country differences, the Great Recession 
did not equally affect all social groups. Young people 
suffered some consequences of the Recession to a 
greater extent. Youth unemployment rates were the 
highest, surpassing 50 percent in Spain and Greece, 
and the labour market became particularly precari-
ous for those entering it for the first time. Specific 
measures aimed at controlling the public deficit had 
direct consequences on young people, such as cuts 
in education, increases in university fees and mea-
sures that sought to make the labour market more 
flexible. Similarly, access to housing continues to be 
a serious problem for young people in some coun-
tries, and there is a paucity of policies to address this 
issue (Green 2017). Consequently, young people 
have been leading actors in protests and, in some 
countries, contributed greatly to changes in the party 
structure by voting for new parties instead of the old 
(Damore, Waters, and Bowler 2011; Galais 2014; 
Della Porta et al. 2017; Andretta 2018). 
Although researchers examined political reac-
tions to the economic crisis in detail, and particularly 
after the wave of protests in 2011 (Ker, Marien and 
Hooghe 2015; Grasso and Giugni 2016), little atten-
tion has been paid to young people’s subsequent 
political perspective and habits. For this reason, this 
article examines this group’s political attitudes and 
behaviour in several European countries over time 
(using biannual waves of the European Social Sur-
vey from 2002 to 2016). In order to examine whether 
changes in young people’s engagement persisted 
over time, it first provides a comprehensive picture of 
the post crisis-period for a number of countries and 
also compares youth’s level of commitment to adults. 
What happened to young people’s political attitudes 
and behaviour during the post crisis period?
In order to respond to this research question, 
we first review previous work on the specificities of 
young people’s political behaviour and on the effect 
of societal transformations on them. Based on those 
theories we argue that the crisis changed the way 
in which citizens relate to politics (Kahler and Lake 
2013; Bermeo and Bartels 2014), and did so to a 
greater extent among the young. So as to test these 
expectations, we first employ a descriptive but com-
prehensive illustration of levels of political involve-
ment in the aftermath of the economic crisis. To mea-
sure political participation we use a classification of 
types of participants that allows us to compare young 
people to adults, and also within this group before, 
during and after the economic crisis. The evidence 
supports the expectations. In Europe, young people 
are more critical, more politically engaged and par-
ticipative in the post-crisis period than before the eco-
nomic crisis. However these changes do not seem to 
be dependent on the economic performance of each 
country as we expected. Overall, the findings point 
to a more critical youth who strongly support recent 
movements such as #metoo and the 2018 feminist 
demonstrations. This leads us to identify these young 
individuals as ‘standby citizens’ who are ready to par-
ticipate when they find the motivation, or when cir-
cumstances deteriorate (Amnå and Ekman 2013). 
Young people and politics in 
troubled times
In order to address the research question in this 
section we build upon previous research on two 
main issues. First, we briefly consider why young 
people and adults differ politically, and in doing so 
highlight two different effects of age: an individual’s 
life cycle, and young people’s sensitivity to intense 
contexts. Second, we review the leading theories 
about political participation and how the Great Re-
cession has challenged them. The combination of 
both strands of research allows us to garner expec-
tations regarding young people’s political engage-
ment in the post-crisis period.
Young citizens’ attitudes and behaviour: why 
are they different?
Since the earliest studies in electoral behaviour, 
research in sociology and political science has ac-
cumulated evidence that young people relate to poli-
tics differently than adults. Regarding their political 
participation, young people are less likely to cast a 
vote in elections (e.g. Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte 
2004; Franklin 2004); they are less interested in poli-
tics in general (Martín 2004; García-Albacete 2014), 
and particularly detached from party politics and tra-
ditional institutions (Scarrow 2000). However, young 
citizens are also more willing to take the streets to 
make their voice heard (Barnes and Kaase 1979), 
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and more likely to use creative forms of action (Nor-
ris 2002; Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005). When 
it comes to other political attitudes, they have been 
said to be more progressive and liberal (Glenn 1974), 
more ‘post-materialistic’ (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005), and more distrustful towards dem-
ocratic institutions (Norris 2002; Dalton 2013); they 
are also simultaneously more supportive of norms 
of citizenship related to active engagement (Dalton 
2008; Dalton 2013) and involved in their communities 
(Zukin, et al. 2006). 
The arguments used to explain young people’s 
distinct political behaviour can be grouped in two 
main approaches. On the one hand, the life cycle 
explanation focuses on life stages and their rela-
tionship to politics. Each life stage that an individual 
goes through implies distinctive social roles, which 
confer different resources, interests, needs and de-
mands to face the costs of being involved in poli-
tics (Jennings 1979; Sears and Levy 2003). Young 
individuals might be less aware of the importance 
of politics than adults, due to their lack of political 
experience. As they adopt adult roles (leaving the 
parental home, finding a first job and finishing their 
studies, marrying and having the first child), indi-
viduals become aware of the importance of politics 
in their daily lives and acquire the knowledge that 
makes involvement in politics easier and meaningful 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Strate et al. 1989). 
The relationship to politics becomes more distant 
again as people age, as retirement implies a de-
crease in social connections and exposure to mobi-
lization networks and, finally, health issues (Milbrath 
1965; Strate et al. 1989; Goerres 2009).1
On the other hand, age also has a psychologi-
cal effect that is linked to the period in which citi-
zens socialize; that is, the moment when individu-
als interiorize social norms and develop the basic 
attitudinal tools to interact with the political system 
(Hyman 1959; Jennings 2007). As young people set 
about developing their political views, they are more 
likely to be influenced by social transformations, 
and particularly so in critical periods (Ryder 1965). 
As individuals approach adulthood, their attitudes 
turn more resistant to change. The main theoretical 
consequence of the political socialization process is 
that the context in which individuals develop their 
political attitudes during their youth ends up condi-
tioning their relationship to politics in the long term 
(Kinder and Sears 1985; Sears and Valentino 1997; 
Dinas 2013). 
When it comes to explaining the impact of the 
economic crisis, both approaches can be useful. 
On the one hand, the crisis may have a significant 
impact on young people’s transition to adulthood, 
by halting, delaying or making more difficult the key 
transitional events: leaving the parental nest, find-
ing a job, or forming a family (Sears and Levy 2003; 
García-Albacete 2014). On the other hand, the con-
text of the crisis can be understood as a critical junc-
ture in conditioning and influencing political views in 
the long run.
Young people’s political participation in trou-
bled times
In light of previous studies on youth’s political be-
haviour, it is not surprising that young people were 
among the protagonists of street mobilizations fu-
eled by an economic crisis that affected political 
systems all over the world. The full consequences 
of the crisis are still to be studied, but a degree of 
consensus has emerged amongst scholars. Re-
garding political attitudes, the crisis provoked a 
rapid decrease in levels of trust towards the main 
political institutions at national level (Torcal 2014; 
Roth, Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2013), but also at 
regional and European level (Armingeon and Ceka 
2014). Although democratic legitimacy has not been 
threatened (Teixeira, Tsatsanis, and Belchior 2014), 
the sharp increase in dissatisfaction with how de-
mocracy works might be an expression of discon-
tent about how democracies dealt with the crisis 
(Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). 
Negative attitudes, however, did not lead to ap-
athy or alienation. Protesters took to the street in 
2011 to the point that they became the protagonists 
from Wall Street to Tarhir Square or Puerta del Sol, 
and across a number of other European Countries. 
The exceptional political mobilizations challenged 
previous theoretical accounts on who, when, how, 
and why people - and particularly the young - mobi-
lize politically. Among the many theories developed 
to explain political behaviour in democratic societ-
ies, the Civic Voluntarism Model has proved to be 
the most effective in explaining who participates in 
politics. Participants are those who have high lev-
els of resources such as time, education, money 
and/or civic abilities (Verba, Schlozmann and Brady 
1995). Following this argument, recent studies pro-
vide convincing evidence that unemployment not 
only depresses political interest in early adulthood, 
but it also has scarring effects on levels of political 
engagement later in life (Emmenegger, Marx and 
Schraff 2017). Similarly, recent research on the po-
litical effects of labour market disadvantages shows 
that increases in both perceived job and financial in-
security erode trust in politics (Schraff 2018). Com-
pelling evidence that greater economic inequality 
yields greater political inequality is also available 
at the aggregate level, as higher levels of income 
inequality powerfully depress political involvement 
among all but the most affluent (Solt 2008). Since 
the crisis reduces the availability of resources, we 
might expect a decrease in levels of political par-
ticipation. However, if that is the case, how can the 
crisis-related protests be explained?
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Given the limited capacity of resource-based the-
ories to account for the intensity of protest move-
ments during the Great Recession, some research-
ers moved to grievance theories to explain 2011 
protest movements. While the Civic Voluntarism 
Model argues that material resources are an essen-
tial requirement for participation, the grievance mod-
el argues that relative deprivation will lead to more 
participation. As Kern et al. (2015) concluded, griev-
ance theory is especially useful in exceptionally neg-
ative conditions since suddenly imposed grievances 
can lead to different modes of protest behaviour. In 
fact, the economic crisis diminished the traditional 
gap in terms of individual socioeconomic positions, 
at least in what concerns low-cost modes of political 
action (Rodon and Guinjoan 2018). Is also consider-
ably boosted the public’s knowledge of the state of 
the economy and reduced information inequalities 
(Marinova and Anduiza 2018).
Finally, beyond individual approaches, it is rel-
evant to take a look at the structure of opportunities 
found in each country. As Grasso and Giugni (2016) 
show, individual-level feelings or relative deprivation 
have a direct effect on the propensity to participate 
in protests, but that effect is greater in contexts char-
acterized by either higher unemployment aggregate 
rates or higher levels of social spending; that is to 
say, in contexts that opened up political opportunities 
for protest among those who experienced a deterio-
ration in living standards during the economic crisis. 
Bassoli and Monticelli (2018), when focusing on pre-
carious young workers in five European cities, pro-
vide a similar argument. ‘Precarious youth’ are more 
active than regular workers –or not—depending on 
labor market regulations, thereby functioning as an 
issue-specific political opportunity structure. Interac-
tions between individual level economic circumstanc-
es and the political context have also been identified 
in terms of government performance. How govern-
ments have handled the economic situation and the 
issue of unemployment alters the extent to which 
perceptions of egocentric economic situation affect 
political participation (Giugni and Grasso 2017).
The effect of other variations in the structure of 
opportunities has been less studied, for various rea-
sons, among them the difficulties in identifying causal 
links. Institutional and contextual characteristics vary 
simultaneously across countries and over time. In the 
early years of the crisis, almost all developed coun-
tries suffered its consequences in terms of slower 
economic growth, higher unemployment, and prob-
lems balancing the public deficit (Matsaganis and 
Leventi 2014). However, since 2011, differences 
among developed countries can be observed within 
Europe. As stated in the introduction, Northern Euro-
pean countries such as Denmark, The Netherlands 
and Germany overcame the worst consequences 
of the crisis around 2011. On the other hand, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece’s economic situation wors-
ened in 2012, when levels of unemployment reached 
rates never seen before (Braun and Tausendpfund 
2014). Political outcomes also varied between Euro-
pean regions. Even though protests spread across 
almost all developed countries (Bermeo and Bartels 
2014), electoral shifts were very different between 
Northern and Southern European countries (Her-
nandez and Kriesi 2016; Bosco and Verney 2012, 
2016). In Southern Europe party systems underwent 
major transformations due to crises among the main-
stream parties and the emergence of new political 
formations in Greece (2012), Italy (2013) and Spain 
(2014/2015) (Teperoglou, Tsatsanis, and Nicolaco-
poulos 2015; Orriols and Cordero 2016; Morlino and 
Raniolo 2017). The only exception was Portugal, 
where the party system remained stable (Fernandes, 
Magalhães, and Santana-Pereira 2018).
Overall, the structure of opportunities interacted 
with social demands and shaped citizens’ behaviour. 
In both protest movements and in the electoral suc-
cess of new political parties, young people played an 
important role (Della Porta et al. 2017). Thus, young 
people’s relationship to politics changed significantly 
during those years. But, what has happened since 
then? To the best of our knowledge no study has 
provided a comprehensive view of levels of political 
engagement and mobilization in the aftermath of the 
Great Recession. Following our previous discussion, 
we offer three different proposals to respond to the 
research question. 
Firstly (1), given the politicized context of the cri-
sis in which this youth cohort came into politics, we 
expect that they may exhibit higher levels of politi-
cal involvement after the crisis. This expectation is 
supported both by both socialization and grievances 
theories. Secondly (2), the literature suggests that 
young people are no longer as involved in politics as 
they once were. A decade after the economic crisis, 
the economic circumstances of young people are still 
challenging. They still suffer precarious conditions 
that hamper their ability to face the costs of being 
politically engaged. Consequently, the alternative 
expectation is that young people may exhibit lower 
levels of political involvement after the crisis. Finally 
(3), following country-specific characteristics, political 
involvement and participation can be sensitive to the 
particular structure of political opportunities. There-
fore, we expect that young people from countries par-
ticularly hit by the crisis will remain more politically 
involved than their counterparts in those that were 
less affected by the Great Recession.
Data and research design
To test our expectations we rely on data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS), a high-quality 
representative biannual survey conducted in more 
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than 20 countries between 2002 and 2016.2 When 
comparing the periods before, during and after 
the crisis, we consider the ‘pre-crisis period’ - the 
years between 2002 and 2006, the ‘crisis period’- 
the years between 2008 and 2012, and finally, the 
‘post-crisis period’ - the years between 2014 and 
2016. We have included all countries in the anal-
yses that have observations for all eight waves of 
the ESS available: Belgium, Switzerland, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia. 
The empirical strategy is two-fold. First, we use a 
descriptive approach in which we depict the evolu-
tion of two political attitudes (political interest and 
confidence towards institutions) and four types of 
‘participants’ in politics for young and adult citizens 
over time. Second, we use a multivariate analysis 
to determine: 1) whether the differences between 
young people and adults hold in the presence of 
specific controls, and 2) to explore the effects of rel-
ative deprivation after the crisis for both adults and 
young people. 
The first indicator of attitude we employ is politi-
cal interest. Political interest expresses an individu-
al’s level of curiosity towards politics, but it is also a 
proxy of cognitive mobilization (Martín and van Deth 
2007: 203). In fact, it is an essential attitude to ex-
plain political participation. Highly interested citizens 
are mobilized and tend to participate in politics to a 
greater extent than other citizens. Secondly, we em-
ploy ‘confidence in institutions’ as a measure. Specif-
ically, we selected the indicator of trust in the national 
parliament because it refers to the core democratic 
institution, and also because, following Denters, Ga-
briel, and Torcal (2007), it can be used to represent 
confidence in democratic institutions in general. Low 
levels of political trust would suggest alienation from 
politics and, in combination with low levels of politi-
cal interest, political disaffection. Some studies have 
shown, nonetheless, that interest and trust have fol-
lowed different patterns during the crisis (Martín and 
Montero 2015). Whereas trust in parliament has de-
creased, citizens’ levels of interest in politics have 
grown in many countries. The combination is coher-
ent with the emergence of critical citizens that are 
participative and also likely to get involved in costly 
forms of participation as protests (Norris 1999; Dal-
ton 2004, Dalton 2007; Dalton 2013).
In order to compare political participation over 
time and across groups of the population, we take 
into account its multidimensional character. If we 
compare across age groups, at the same level of po-
litical interest, young people prefer non-institutional 
actions while adults are more likely to participate 
through representative institutions (García-Albacete 
2014). Comparing one single mode of action could 
result in biased estimates regarding profiles of po-
litical involvement. In addition, preferred modes of 
political action vary significantly across countries 
(van Deth 1986; García-Albacete 2014; Quaranta 
2015), as they depend on the structure of opportuni-
ties and specific social demands (Kriesi et al. 1992; 
Vráblíková 2014). For these reasons, we propose 
a general classification that allows us to distinguish 
citizens according to types of political involvement 
while being general enough to be comparable across 
age groups and countries. To build the classification 
we start by using the standard distinction between 
institutional and non-institutional participation. The 
institutional participation category refers to actions 
related to elections or political parties and includes: 
turnout in the last general election, contact with politi-
cians, and voluntary work for a political party. Non-
institutional participation includes any form of action 
aside from elections: strikes, attending demonstra-
tions, signing a petition, and boycotting products for 
political reasons. The combination of the two catego-
ries results in a fourfold typology: (a) none for those 
individuals who did not participate in any mode of 
action; (b) protesters, for those citizens who partici-
pated in at least one non-institutional activity and did 
not participate in any institutional action; (c) turnout, 
for people that participated in at least one institutional 
mode of participation but did not participate in any 
non-institutional forms; and, finally, (d) both, for those 
who participated both in at least one institutional and 
one non-institutional mode of action.3
Furthermore, to compare young people to adults 
we need a demarcation line between those two life 
stages. Following previous studies,4 the strategy 
here is to use as a criterion the average age in which 
a main event in the transition to adulthood takes 
place: having a first child. The average age is 30 for 
Europe. In addition, we take into account that se-
nior citizens participate in a different way to adults, 
and thus including them in the same group could 
obscure the differences between young people and 
adults. To classify interviewees as senior citizens 
we use the most common legal age for retirement 
across Europe: 65. Furthermore, to simplify the de-
scription we drop the latter group from the analyses 
presented below. The resulting categories for life 
stages are: (a) young people for those individuals 
who are aged 15 to 30 years old; and (b) adults for 
those individuals that are 31 to 65 years old, and (c) 
elder people, for individuals that are 66 year or older 
(not included in the analyses). 
The second part of our analytical strategy uses 
multivariate techniques to provide a test that takes 
into account the potential different compositions of 
the groups in key individual antecedents, such as ed-
ucation. For this part, we will concentrate on political 
participation and the comparison between those who 
do not participate at all to the rest of the population. 
As we will see in the description, and given the spo-
radic character of protest mobilizations, this is a key 
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of – politics. Only Portugal, where young people are 
as interested in politics as adults, deviates from this 
pattern. When compared to other South European 
countries such as Spain, the cohort of young people 
socialized in democracy has maintained relatively 
high levels of political interest, due to the character 
of the transition to democracy (Fishman and Lizardo 
2013). An additional explanation could be that Por-
tugal suffered an earlier economic crisis in 2002 that 
mobilized young people significantly.5
Regarding the evolution of young people’s political 
interest over time, we can observe some differences 
in comparison to adults, but also variation across 
countries. Young people and adults follow the same 
pattern in Germany, France, Great Britain and Ire-
land, where we observe an increase in their levels 
of political interest in 2008, when the crisis began. In 
Switzerland and Norway, there are no changes over 
time. In four countries, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
The Netherlands and Slovenia, increasing or stable 
levels of political interest among adults contrast with 
negative trends for young people. Overall, and in 
line with the ‘impressionable years’ thesis that em-
phasizes how young people are more sensitive to 
contextual changes, we find larger variations across 
time for young people than for adults. Adults’ lev-
els of political interest remain more stable over the 
years, without sharp changes, while young people’s 
levels of interest show abrupt changes in short peri-
ods. Figure 1 exemplifies such changes in Finland, 
Great Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and Slovenia, where significant ups and 
downs are visible for young people even in short 
periods of two years. 
Let’s now turn our attention to confidence in institu-
tions and specifically to levels of trust in the country’s 
parliament (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Once 
more, we observe large variation across countries. 
A decrease in trust during the crisis is found in eight 
countries, and no changes in five cases; while in only 
two countries the level of trust increased during the 
crisis. The countries where trust has decreased since 
the crisis (2008-2010) are: Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. 
We find no changes in trust in Belgium, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, The Netherlands and Norway. Final-
ly, we observe an increase in the levels of trust in the 
national parliament in Hungary, Poland and Sweden. 
Young people do not distrust political institutions 
any more than adults or senior citizens do (see Fig-
ure 2), contrary to what other studies have claimed 
(Norris 1999; O’Toole, Marsh and Su 2003; Dalton 
2004: 94; Sloam 2007)6. This finding is not exception-
al, as previous studies have provided evidence that 
young people trusted basic institutions of democracy 
as much (if not more) than adults at the beginning 
of the 21st century (García-Albacete 2014: 142-143). 
As the black lines indicate in Figure 2, on average, 
distinction over time. Therefore, the categories for 
the dependent variable in the multivariate analyses 
are: (a) none versus (b) some kind of political action. 
In addition to life stages, the multivariate analysis in-
cludes respondents’ occupational status (in paid em-
ployment, student, unemployed and other situations). 
Finally, as control variables, the models include gen-
der and years of education completed. 
A post crisis generation? Political participa-
tion and attitudes
As said, in this section we present our descriptive 
analyses of young people’s political attitudes and be-
haviour over time. Findings show great heterogene-
ity across countries. In order to make interpretations 
easier, in what follows, for each attitude or behaviour 
we first address the general trend for the entire popu-
lation and then we establish a double comparison: 
(a) between the youth and adults over time, and (b) 
among young people before, during and after the 
economic crisis. 
Young people’s political attitudes: political 
interest and trust in institutions
When looking at the trends for the whole popula-
tion, there is a large variation in levels of political in-
terest over time in each country (see Figure A1 in 
the Appendix). In some countries, the economic cri-
sis came with an increase in political interest. That 
is the case of Germany, Spain, France, Great Brit-
ain, Ireland and Slovenia when we compare average 
citizens’ political interest in 2006 to 2008 or 2010. In 
other countries, the crisis did not have a visible effect, 
and levels of political interest remained stable (Bel-
gium, Switzerland, and Norway). In some countries 
the increase in political interest in 2008 was followed 
by a visible decrease in political interest shortly after 
(2010-2012), such as in Ireland and Great Britain. A 
decrease in political interest is also visible in Hungary 
around the same time. In two Nordic countries, Swe-
den and Finland, the increase in political interest is 
only visible later on, in 2014-2016. In those cases, the 
increase takes place far beyond the hardest years of 
the economic crisis and might be related to another 
crisis, in this case, the so-called refugee crisis. 
Regarding age differences, Figure 1 shows the 
average level of political interest for each age group 
(young people in black, adults in grey and seniors in 
white) by country and over time (2002-2016). A com-
mon pattern emerges: young people are significantly 
less interested in politics than adults (as represented 
in black lines). This is not surprising, as previous re-
search has repeatedly shown that young people are 
less interested in politics (e.g. Glenn and Grimes 
1968; Prior 2010). This gap can be understood with 
the life-cycle hypothesis discussed above, and par-
ticularly, by a lack of experience in – and knowledge 
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young people declare higher levels of trust in na-
tional parliament in almost all countries at some point 
during the period 2002-2016 (Belgium, Switzerland, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden). In other coun-
tries (such as Spain, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, 
Norway, Poland and Slovenia) we find no differences 
between adults and young people. Over time, young 
people and adults follow the same trend of stability. 
This is clearly visible in Figure 2, where lines overlap 
with each other.
In sum, the descriptive evidence does not allow 
us to determine whether young people are particu-
larly interested in politics or critical towards institu-
tions. Both adults and young people share the same 
trends. We expect to observe more differences re-
garding political behaviour. 
Young people’s political behaviour: modes 
of political participation
Let us now turn our attention to different modes 
of political participation. Figure 3 shows the percent-
age of young people that participate only in protests 
(black), only in institutional politics by voting (white), 
in both protest and institutional actions (light grey); 
and finally, the percentage of young people who do 
not participate in any activity (dark grey). Figure 4 
provides the same information for adults. 
The first visible pattern is common to both young 
people and adults. Among both age groups there is 
a larger percentage of citizens who participate ex-
clusively in electoral politics. Notwithstanding this 
regularity, there are also visible differences between 
age groups. Young people participate to a greater 
extent than adults in protest or in both institutional 
and non-institutional actions. Regarding non-par-
ticipants, the percentage of young citizens who do 
not participate in any kind of political action is also 
larger than the percentage of adults who do not par-
ticipate. This evidence confirms something that oth-
er studies previously found: young people are less 
participative in electoral politics (Blais, Gidengil and 
Nevitte 2004; Franklin 2004) and when they par-
ticipate, they prefer non-institutional forms of action 
(Barnes and Kaase 1979; García-Albacete 2014). 
Finally, the relatively large percentage of young citi-
zens in the mixed category ‘both’ confirms that they 
are more likely to combine different forms of political 
participation (García-Albacete 2014).
Figure 1.
Average levels of political interest over age groups and time, by country
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Figure 2.
Average levels of trust in a country’s parliament, over age groups and time, by country
Figure 3.
Types of participants among young people by country and over time
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Having identified general patterns and differenc-
es between young people and adults, we now fo-
cus on trends over time. First, Figures 3 and 4 show 
that although there is large heterogeneity across 
countries, adults and young people’s participation 
followed the same dynamics. That is to say, when 
percentages of any mode of political participation in-
crease in one specific year, this increase is typically 
found for both young people and adults. The same 
occurs when political participation decreases. Same 
trends across age signal the existence of period ef-
fects that have had an impact on all citizens. 
Even though the period effects are shared 
by young and adult citizens, we now focus on 
changes across time and particularly after the cri-
sis started (see in Figures 3 and 4, from 2008 to 
2012). In some countries, institutional participa-
tion remained stable, for both adults and young 
people (see for instance Belgium, The Nether-
lands, Ireland and Norway). In a second group of 
countries, institutional participation decreased; al-
though the change is less intense among adults, 
as in the case of the Czech Republic and Finland. 
In a third and more numerous group of countries, 
institutional participation increased; this is the 
case of Germany, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Por-
tugal, and Slovenia. Finally, in countries like Swit-
zerland, France and Sweden the trends shift dur-
ing the period of crisis.
Regarding other types of participants, there are 
no clear trends during the crisis. In some countries 
- Belgium, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia - 
the percentage of respondents that both participat-
ed in institutional and non-institutional actions, and 
the percentage of respondents that only protested, 
decreased. In other countries, such as Switzerland, 
Germany, Spain, Poland and Portugal, we can iden-
tify an increase in the levels of political participation. 
Additionally, in these countries, the increase in pro-
test occurs instead in the post-crisis period. 
The increase in political participation from 2012 
onwards is a common trend for both adults and 
young people (see Figures 3 and 4). It is visible for 
all types of participation and it has its parallel in a 
decrease in the percentage of respondents that did 
not participate at all. It is, however, in the post-cri-
sis period (2014-2016) when we find more political 
involvement: the number of citizens that participate 
in institutional actions and in both protest and insti-
tutional modes increased significantly. To provide a 
better illustration, Figure 5 focuses on the percent-
age of non-participants (category “none”) for young 
people (black lines) and for adults (grey lines). 
Figure 4.
Types of participants among adults by country and over time
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Again we observe a general trend despite heteroge-
neity across countries: in the post-crisis scenario there is 
greater mobilization. At the end of the period only in the 
Czech Republic, France and Hungary is there a larger 
percentage of respondents who are not involved in poli-
tics than during the crisis. As we previously found, with 
regards to other indicators, young people are more vola-
tile, and thus tend to change more in a shorter period of 
time. In addition to the general trend of political mobiliza-
tion, Figure 5 shows that growing mobilization particular-
ly affected young people. Adults did not change in many 
countries or, as happened in Hungary and Slovenia, fol-
lowed a different pattern than young people.
In sum, young people, who are more sensitive to 
context, changed their political behaviour to a greater 
extent than adults. This change is consistent with our 
first expectation: that young people became more po-
litically involved during the crisis. Despite experienc-
ing hard economic conditions, the fact that they so-
cialize politically during a politicized period resulted in 
increased levels of political participation. This mobili-
zation finds no parallel among adults, signalling that 
the cohort effect might be a good mechanism to ex-
plain the changes observed. Regarding our third ex-
pectation that changes would be particularly visible in 
the countries hardest hit by the economic crisis, the 
descriptive findings do not support this view. Further 
analyses are required to understand these differences 
better. We address this issue in the next section.
A mobilized post-crisis youth? A multivariate 
approach
The descriptive findings support the expectation 
that citizens became more politically involved dur-
ing the crisis and maintained high levels of political 
involvement thereafter. To confirm the robustness of 
the results, controlling for the potential different com-
position of age groups, we run logit equations con-
ducted separately for each country. Figure 6 summa-
rizes the results by plotting the predicted probabilities 
of not participating in politics (versus any form of 
political participation) over years and across coun-
tries. We have introduced as the main independent 
variable the interaction of age and year and, as con-
trol variables, gender, level of education and occupa-
tional status (the data are available in Table A1 in the 
Appendix). The results confirm previous descriptive 
findings. Whereas adults’ participation has remained 
fairly stable, young people’s participation increased 
over time. We observe that young people’s levels of 
non-participation (higher values) decrease over time 
in Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. On the other hand, 
we see stability for both adults and young people in 
Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, The Netherlands 
and Sweden. Finally, young people tend to be less 
participative in recent years in the Czech Republic, 
France and Hungary.
Figure 5.
Average levels of non-participants among young and adult citizens, over time
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Again, we interpret higher levels of involvement as 
a consequence of a highly politicized period after the 
economic crisis. Far from creating distance from poli-
tics, we see that one long-term effect of the crisis is 
an increase in young people’s political engagement. 
Although political attitudes changed in a similar way 
for adults and young people, among young citizens 
interest translated into political action to a greater 
extent than among adults. It could be that the high 
levels of political interest and the acquisition of par-
ticipatory habits become a cohort characteristic that 
could have long term effects. 
Following previous arguments, we also expected 
this pattern to differ according to the country-specific 
structure of opportunities. Specifically, we expected 
mobilization to be greater in countries that were par-
ticularly affected by the crisis. However, as we dis-
cussed before, no trend can be found across coun-
tries that supports such expectation. Over time, levels 
of political participation have increased in countries 
that were harder hit by the crisis, such as Spain and 
Portugal; but also in countries where the crisis was 
less intense, such as, for instance, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Finland and Norway. 
Our research design is not well equipped to ex-
plain this finding as there are several factors that may 
have influenced young people’s high levels of politi-
cal involvement in recent years. High participation 
levels could be related to country specific domestic 
politics, such as whether elections were particular-
ly competitive (as competitiveness in elections is a 
good mobilizer for young people; see Franklin 2004) 
or the success of mobilization tactics by new or small 
political parties. An increase in political participa-
tion might also be the result of international political 
conflicts beyond the Great Recession, such as the 
refugee and migration crisis. Most likely, both expla-
nations account for the increase in young people’s 
political participation. The economic crisis might have 
played a greater role in Portugal and Spain, whereas 
the reactions to migration politics might explain mo-
bilization in Central and Northern Europe. Economic 
and migration crisis might also interact. 
Irrespective of the specific events that have in-
creased political participation, the increase in mobi-
lized citizens over time and across countries allows 
us to be optimistic. On average, young people are, 
after the crisis, more participative than before, in spite 
of the strategies followed by certain governments to 
increase the costs of participating in politics. 
Conclusion
It is clear that the economic crisis has had an 
effect on European’s citizens’ attitudes and behav-
iour; and particularly so among young people. But 
what is young people’s level of political engage-
ment 10 years later? In this article, we provide a 
comprehensive description of young citizen’s politi-
Figure 6.
Predicted probabilities of non-participation (multivariate logistic regression models)
Note: Probabilities are calculated from the models presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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cal attitudes and behaviour before, during and after 
the Great Recession. We focus on young people as 
protagonists of mobilizations against the economic 
and political consequences of the crisis. The results 
confirm that their attitudes and behaviour have 
changed significantly during the last decade. Fur-
thermore, young people’s levels of political interest 
and participation remained higher in the post-crisis 
period than before 2008, whereas adults, in gener-
al, maintained similar levels of political participation 
during the same period. We interpret these chang-
es as a cohort effect: contextual changes are more 
intense for young people according to socialization 
theory. If a cohort effect is present, we can expect 
the post-crisis youth to remain more active during 
the following decades.
In this article we have used an integrative approach 
when it comes to political participation. Instead of ex-
amining only one form of action, we have provided 
a typology that allows equivalent comparison across 
age groups. Additionally, this classification allows 
us to capture political nuances in recent years, with 
street mobilization periods followed by changes in 
party systems. In some countries, in Southern Eu-
rope for example, these changes have been signifi-
cant. By using this perspective we can conclude that 
whether young people choose to make their voices 
heard by means of the ballot box or by protesting in 
the street, precarious working conditions have not re-
sulted in apathy or alienation, and therefore our sec-
ond expectation is rejected. 
Regarding variation across countries, our de-
scription shows great heterogeneity. No pattern 
could be identified regarding the evolution of politi-
cal attitudes. When we focus on political participa-
tion, we observe similarities even in countries with 
contrasting economic performance during the crisis, 
such as Germany and Spain. We have to acknowl-
edge, however, that we are using a perspective that 
comes from countries that were harder hit by the 
economic crisis, that is, those in Southern Europe. 
Since 2014, Central and Northern European coun-
tries have experienced mobilizations linked to the 
emergence or success of new radical right parties, 
whether they support their positions or reject them. 
A detailed account on current levels of political par-
ticipation among young citizens requires the inte-
gration of other dimensions, such as the migration 
crisis, into any explanation. 
Finally, we have provided a necessary but only 
preliminary account of attitudes and behaviour. This 
initial step has a number of shortcomings. First, the 
availability of data to examine young citizens’ politi-
cal participation across countries is rather poor. Ei-
ther youth studies are not comparable across coun-
tries or, when data is comparable such as through 
the ESS, youth samples are small, since data col-
lection seeks to be representative of the whole pop-
ulation and not specifically of young adults. Small 
samples impede running detailed analyses of, for in-
stance, personal economic circumstances, and how 
they affect young people’s relationship to the politi-
cal system. More recent research has focused at-
tention on the importance of distinguishing between, 
for instance, economic grievances and feelings of 
relative deprivation (both in comparison to others 
and in comparison to one’s own situation over time; 
see Kurer et al. 2018) among the factors that ex-
plain protest mobilization in Europe. 
Lack of resources is likely to produce apathy 
while a change in resources is more likely to mo-
bilize protest actions (Kurer et al. 2018). In light of 
changes in economic and labour conditions across 
Europe, the distinction between level of resources 
on the one hand, and changes in the endowment of 
resources on the other, could be key to understand-
ing what drives young people out into the streets. 
Some evidence is already available on the potential 
translation of economic inequalities into political in-
equalities for young people in Spain, as the result of 
the economic crisis (García-Albacete et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, other potential sources of inequality 
among young people, for instance gender or im-
migration background, or the interaction among the 
diverse sources of inequality, have rarely been ad-
dressed from an international perspective, due to 
the lack of data. 
Finally, a second limitation relates to the exclu-
sion of governments’ response to political mobili-
zation during the crisis. In Spain, for instance, the 
costs of participating in demonstrations are higher 
since the approval of the “Ley Mordaza” (Gag Law). 
Currently, different modes of political protests that 
were allowed before the crisis are now punished 
with serious fines or are directly prohibited. Our 
operationalization of political participation does not 
allow us to capture those effects. Data on repres-
sion strategies could be used to complement our 
description. In this regard, it is of great benefit that 
some European projects7 are currently collecting 
data specifically for young people, and will provide 
us with additional tools to examine changes in the 
coming years.
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Appendix
Figure A1.
Average levels of political interest, over time and by country
Figure A2.
Average levels of trust in National Parliament for the whole population, over time and by country
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Figure A4.
Average levels of mixed participation (both institutional and non-institutional) amongst young people and adults
Figure A3.
Average levels of non-institutional participation (protest) amongst young people and adults
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 BE CH CZ DE ES FI FR GB HU IE NL NO PL PT SE SI
Young 
(15-30)
0.826*** 0.801*** -0.014 0.867*** 1.613*** 0.493** 0.637*** 1.080*** 0.749*** 1.565*** 1.030*** 1.178*** 1.034*** 1.357*** 0.600** 0.858***
(0.223) (0.182) (0.208) (0.178) (0.189) (0.229) (0.178) (0.159) (0.159) (0.154) (0.195) (0.206) (0.123) (0.160) (0.241) (0.175)
2004 -0.396* 0.044 0.361*** 0.394*** -0.146 0.183 -0.362*** 0.337*** 0.097 0.198 0.416*** -0.042 0.020 0.177 -0.057 0.468***
(0.207) (0.116) (0.109) (0.124) (0.168) (0.153) (0.138) (0.122) (0.133) (0.141) (0.132) (0.192) (0.110) (0.116) (0.199) (0.140)
2006 -0.588*** 0.452*** 0.547*** 0.285* -0.128 -0.357*** 0.286** 0.518*** 0.521*** 0.447*** 0.108 0.237** -0.146 -0.296 0.147
(0.222) (0.125) (0.122) (0.154) (0.166) (0.134) (0.121) (0.131) (0.147) (0.136) (0.189) (0.107) (0.117) (0.215) (0.145)
2008 -0.351* 0.217* 0.243** 0.504*** 0.185 0.106 -0.474*** 0.323*** 0.180 0.328** 0.296** 0.027 0.061 0.258** -0.210 0.306**
(0.208) (0.122) (0.114) (0.129) (0.144) (0.156) (0.139) (0.120) (0.136) (0.150) (0.143) (0.199) (0.113) (0.114) (0.219) (0.145)
2010 -0.007 0.449*** 0.195* 0.486*** 0.128 -0.023 -0.092 0.336*** 0.543*** 0.871*** 0.376*** -0.315 0.039 0.092 -0.500** 0.592***
(0.194) (0.125) (0.113) (0.125) (0.156) (0.168) (0.136) (0.117) (0.129) (0.128) (0.142) (0.224) (0.112) (0.117) (0.255) (0.136)
2012 0.166 -0.032 0.117 0.416*** 0.093 -0.129 -0.445*** 0.557*** 0.641*** 0.747*** 0.410*** -0.004 0.316*** 0.386*** -0.368 0.573***
(0.186) (0.137) (0.117) (0.131) (0.154) (0.163) (0.139) (0.117) (0.120) (0.129) (0.143) (0.200) (0.104) (0.113) (0.231) (0.139)
2014 -0.029 -0.027 0.385*** 0.405*** 0.196 0.141 -0.070 0.424*** 0.492*** 0.616*** 0.374** -0.085 0.395*** 0.122 -0.382 0.790***
(0.198) (0.136) (0.112) (0.133) (0.156) (0.162) (0.135) (0.121) (0.128) (0.134) (0.147) (0.225) (0.108) (0.137) (0.248) (0.140)
2016 -0.086 0.022 0.452*** 0.486*** -0.056 0.011 0.156 0.213 0.470*** 0.978*** 0.709*** -0.116 0.047 0.006 -0.794*** 0.722***
(0.207) (0.136) (0.111) (0.136) (0.161) (0.174) (0.127) (0.131) (0.128) (0.129) (0.146) (0.223) (0.111) (0.141) (0.290) (0.139)
Young * 
2004
-0.237 -0.390 0.431* -0.101 -0.824*** 0.147 0.006 -0.286 0.274 -0.269 -0.496* -0.351 0.153 -0.435** -0.437 0.346
(0.330) (0.245) (0.235) (0.240) (0.269) (0.300) (0.264) (0.222) (0.217) (0.213) (0.281) (0.320) (0.176) (0.208) (0.368) (0.228)
Young * 
2006
-0.584 0.153 0.053 -0.658*** 0.238 0.365 0.161 -0.445* -0.238 -0.338 -0.063 -0.384** -0.245 0.054 0.408*
(0.432) (0.268) (0.230) (0.249) (0.325) (0.265) (0.213) (0.233) (0.226) (0.275) (0.298) (0.175) (0.209) (0.350) (0.237)
Young * 
2008
-0.610 -0.301 0.655*** 0.036 -0.975*** 0.580** 0.432* 0.043 -0.209 -0.129 -0.470 -0.428 -0.517*** -0.689*** -0.015 0.252
(0.381) (0.246) (0.248) (0.249) (0.239) (0.291) (0.254) (0.214) (0.240) (0.233) (0.293) (0.349) (0.188) (0.222) (0.385) (0.234)
Young * 
2010
-0.878*** -0.057 0.355 -0.189 -0.904*** 0.365 0.513** 0.202 -0.252 -0.415** -0.332 0.095 -0.294 -0.310 -0.449 0.121
(0.338) (0.261) (0.240) (0.233) (0.278) (0.324) (0.256) (0.209) (0.220) (0.191) (0.287) (0.332) (0.192) (0.221) (0.466) (0.234)
Young * 
2012
-0.838** -0.075 0.582** 0.067 -0.741*** 0.095 0.157 -0.098 -0.169 -0.677*** -0.285 -0.241 -0.678*** -0.813*** 0.431 -0.141
(0.354) (0.260) (0.268) (0.247) (0.263) (0.318) (0.270) (0.217) (0.208) (0.199) (0.278) (0.326) (0.180) (0.221) (0.358) (0.243)
Young * 
2014
-1.101*** -0.158 0.551** -0.299 -0.896*** 0.202 0.353 -0.181 0.058 -0.480** -0.139 -0.295 -0.541*** -0.592** -0.292 -0.186
(0.364) (0.271) (0.249) (0.255) (0.289) (0.328) (0.252) (0.229) (0.221) (0.214) (0.279) (0.342) (0.206) (0.276) (0.409) (0.245)
Young * 
2016
-1.442*** -0.374 0.697*** -0.109 -0.848*** -0.062 0.385 0.037 0.424* -0.665*** -0.468 -0.560 -0.464** -0.904*** 0.759* -0.564**
(0.471) (0.262) (0.243) (0.264) (0.286) (0.329) (0.263) (0.234) (0.229) (0.207) (0.297) (0.371) (0.198) (0.289) (0.426) (0.254)
Women -0.226** 0.141** 0.080* -0.021 -0.062 -0.265*** 0.080 -0.008 -0.096* -0.029 -0.051 -0.050 0.089* 0.119** -0.251** -0.003
(0.090) (0.059) (0.044) (0.055) (0.063) (0.071) (0.059) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.065) (0.087) (0.047) (0.051) (0.101) (0.056)
Years of 
education
-0.118*** -0.133*** -0.062*** -0.266*** -0.066*** -0.146*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.125*** -0.075*** -0.174*** -0.137*** -0.148*** -0.065*** -0.119*** -0.116***




0.981*** 0.190 0.241** 0.010 -0.073 0.141 0.187 0.378*** 0.561*** 0.376*** 0.162 0.220 0.118 0.131 0.458*** 0.036
(0.174) (0.130) (0.109) (0.116) (0.129) (0.142) (0.143) (0.121) (0.106) (0.090) (0.148) (0.148) (0.096) (0.116) (0.164) (0.098)
Table A1.
Logistic regressions no participation by age group and year
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 BE CH CZ DE ES FI FR GB HU IE NL NO PL PT SE SI
Unemployed 0.570*** 0.623*** 0.538*** 0.882*** 0.243*** 0.735*** 0.358*** 0.736*** 0.306*** 0.662*** 0.741*** 0.710*** 0.477*** 0.340*** 0.867*** 0.171*
(0.155) (0.155) (0.089) (0.083) (0.094) (0.112) (0.102) (0.091) (0.096) (0.073) (0.126) (0.192) (0.079) (0.077) (0.170) (0.102)
Other 
situation 0.121 -0.060 0.004 0.088 -0.118 0.121 -0.246*** 0.127** -0.098 -0.015 0.120 0.143 -0.157*** -0.189*** 0.388** -0.383***
(0.110) (0.073) (0.054) (0.068) (0.087) (0.093) (0.076) (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) (0.075) (0.123) (0.059) (0.065) (0.154) (0.074)
Constant -1.077*** 0.052 -0.179 0.892*** -1.193*** -0.299* -0.183 -0.484*** -0.143 -1.143*** -0.163 -0.845*** 0.554*** -0.752*** -1.291*** -0.161
(0.206) (0.139) (0.146) (0.168) (0.142) (0.175) (0.146) (0.136) (0.146) (0.150) (0.156) (0.207) (0.129) (0.107) (0.252) (0.152)
Nagelkerke’s 
R2
0.048 0.044 0.024 0.101 0.039 0.058 0.047 0.065 0.054 0.079 0.070 0.065 0.053 0.037 0.050 0.059
Observa-
tions 8,178 6,872 9,615 13,279 8,593 8,452 8,161 10,124 8,760 10,492 9,171 7,107 9,743 8,651 8,146 6,931
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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